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World Income Distribution: Which Way? 
 
         PETER SVEDBERG 
 
Over the past few years, a large number of studies have aimed at estimating 
changes in relative income distribution across countries and globally. Some of the 
studies find the distribution to have worsened considerably, others that it has 
become more even. One objective of this article is to identify and quantify the 
reasons for these conflicting results. Another objective is to highlight the 
difference between changes in relative and absolute income distribution. While 
the relative distribution over the entire range of countries seems to have improved 
somewhat over the past 2-3 decades according to the most relevant indicators, the 
absolute income gaps between rich and poor countries have widened 
considerably. It is further demonstrated that these gaps will inevitably continue to 
grow for many decades to come. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Several inter-related issues concerning income distribution in the world have come to the 
forefront in recent years. A main stimulus has been the many efforts to renew growth 
theory since the seminal works of Lucas [1988] and Romer [1990], which pose new 
questions for distribution. Studies of income distribution have also been helped by 
improvements of the database, despite considerable remaining shortcomings. The new 
empirical evidence on distribution is not always congruous, however. 
One of the contending issues is whether there is a general tendency for income 
distribution within countries to become more unequal over time in the wake of economic 
growth and globalisation. Extended and improved data now allow this question to be 
addressed for some 50 countries. The estimates suggest that in a few countries, income 
distribution has turned significantly more uneven, and in another small number of 
countries, significantly more even. In the great majority of the 50 countries, however, 
income distribution, measured in different ways, has remained more or less unaltered 
between the individual years compared [Li et al., 1998; Sala-i-Martin, 2002]. Some 
investigations, based on cross-country observations, find economic growth to have a 
neutral effect on income distribution in general (e.g. [Dollar and Kraay, 2002]). 
Ravallion [2001] shows that ‘this aggregate picture hides more than it reveals’, i.e. that 
individual country experiences are much too split for an average to make much sense.
i  
Also the reverse link has received renewed interest. In contrast to earlier 
conventional wisdom, a string of studies in the mid 1990s found an equal distribution of 
incomes within countries to be beneficial for economic growth in subsequent periods 
[Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Perotti, 1996].   4
More recent findings suggest that this result must be qualified [Deininger and Squire, 
1998; Forbes, 2000; Barro, 2000] 
Another intensively studied question is whether there has been a change in 
absolute poverty over time. The World Bank [2000/01] and associated researchers [Chen 
and Ravallion, 2001] find the share of absolute poor in the developing world to have 
marginally declined (from 28 to 23 per cent) between 1987 and 1998, and the number of 
poor people to have remained more or less unaltered (at about 1.2 billion). These results 
are now contested. Reddy and Pogge [2002] and Deaton [2001] question the method used 
to construct the P$1 poverty line. Sala-i-Martin [2002] finds a considerably lower 
incidence of poverty in the world and, most notably, that the P$1-a-day poverty rate has 
declined dramatically, from 20 per cent in the early 1970s to 5 per cent in 1998. 
  In the past few years, an extensive literature has studied a related controversial 
question: How has the relative distribution of incomes developed over time, across 
countries and globally? This is the main question to be addressed in the present article. I 
will attempt to explain why the various studies have reached completely different results. 
In order to economise on space, only studies published in the last few years are covered.  
The most alarming estimates emanate from the United Nations Development 
Program [UNDP, 1999] and the World Bank [2000/01]. Both find that the ratio of per 
capita incomes in rich and poor countries (defined differently; see below) has doubled 
since 1960, while according to other studies, the distribution has remained relatively 
stable (see Table 1). The two studies reporting the most encouraging picture of world 
income distribution are Melchior et al. [2000] and Sala-i-Martin [2002]. Applying   5
different distribution measures, they conclude that income inequality across countries 
(and globally) was substantially reduced between 1970 and 1998.  
    [Table  1  about  here] 
The conflicting results to a large extent stem from researchers having used 
different methods for estimating per-capita income (section II) and having applied 
different measures of income distribution (section III). Differences in how countries are 
selected and weighted according to population size is also part of the explanation (section 
IV). Yet another reason is that different time periods have been examined (section V). It 
is also notable that some studies are confined to estimating inter-country distribution, 
while others take a global perspective by also incorporating intra-country distribution 
(section VI). The reliability and relevance of the basic income and population data used 
in the literature are assessed in section VII. 
This article further focuses on a dimension of world income distribution largely 
neglected throughout the growth-cum-distribution literature, namely the absolute 
distribution of incomes across countries (section VIII). Almost all measures used in the 
distribution literature are indicators of relative distribution. It will be shown that the 
divergence—increased absolute income gaps—between the poor countries in Africa, Asia 
and the Americas and the rich countries in the OECD area has increased notably since 
1970 and that further divergence is inevitable for at least one or two generations to come. 
A summary of past developments and main conclusions is given in section IX and some 
reflections concerning the future close the article in section X.  
 
II. THE INCOME MEASURES    6
Several studies use national-account GDP data, converted to US dollars at the current 
exchange rates (denoted FX$ in Table 1) as a proxy for (per capita) income All these 
studies find very large income discrepancies across countries and that the differences 
have increased markedly with time. This result holds regardless of which measure of 
income distribution is employed and irrespective of other methodological differences (to 
be discussed below). In sharp contrast, none of the studies reporting unchanged or 
improved income distribution has used FX$ income data from national accounts. 
The most common alternative (or additional) income measure used in the studies 
is also based on per capita GDP from national accounts, but adjusted for differences in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) across countries. The PPP-adjusted income estimates (P$) 
are obtained using the same relative ‘international’ prices for valuing all goods and 
services in each and every country. These adjusted income measures hence take into 
account that the relative prices for goods and services only sold locally in relation to the 
prices of goods and services facing international competition (traded goods) are 
significantly lower in poor than rich countries. The per capita P$ income therefore differs 
the most from FX$ income for the poorest countries. For example, in 1999, the estimated 
per capita income in Ethiopia was P$600, as compared to FX$100. (The World Bank 
[2000/01: Tables 1 and 1a] provides data for more than 200 countries.)  
Melchior et al. [2000] and Sala-i-Martin [2002] derive annual estimates of inter-
national income distribution since 1970, alternately employing FX$ and P$ income 
data—while holding all other entities in the estimations constant. When the estimates are 
based on FX$ data, they find a marked increase in inter-country inequality by all their 
distribution indicators. When using P$ incomes, they find  the distribution to have   7
notably improved by the late 1990s. The unquestionable conclusion is that the choice of 
income measure is a major determinant of the divergent results in the literature. (Schultz 
[1998], Firebaugh [1999] and Radetzki and Jonsson [2001] report similar comparative 
results.) 
 
(a) The FX$ Income Estimates 
When it comes to making international comparisons of material living standards across 
countries, there is wide agreement among economists that FX$ income data are not 
appropriate, for several reasons.
ii One is that the official exchange rates in many countries 
have been (and in some, still are) distorted (often overvalued). This is particularly true for 
the many poor countries where the currency is non-convertible, trade barriers are high, 
and capital movements controlled by the government.  
A related problem is that a discrete changes in the official exchange rate has a 
proportional effect on per-capita income when valued by FX$. This is probably the most 
important reason why the studies employing FX$ income data have found such a drastic 
deterioration in the distribution of income across countries. The majority of the poor 
countries have recurrently devalued their currencies since the 1960s. It is not the case, 
however, that the purchasing power of the incomes of the population falls in strict 
proportion to a devaluation. The (intended) main effect of a devaluation is usually to raise 
the domestic relative price of tradable to non-tradable goods, which will have different 
effects on the incomes of different population groups, while leaving average real income 
more or less unaffected.    8
Furthermore, FX$ per capita incomes imply implausibly large differences in 
material living standards across countries. Ethiopia, Chad, Somalia, Haiti and other very 
poor countries have a per capita income of around FX$150 [World Bank, 2000/01]. In 
relation to the corresponding income in the US, this suggests a ratio of about 0.005. It 
seems impossible that the average person in these poor countries should only consume 
0.5 per cent of what the average person in the US does (while about 2 per cent of US 
consumption when comparing P$ incomes). Moreover, incomes are unevenly distributed 
within these poor countries, which implies that the lowest quintile only has some 20-40 
FX$ to live on per annum. Such low incomes suggest a significantly higher mortality rate 
resulting from undernutrition and illness in the poorest of countries than what is actually 
observed [Pritchett, 1997].  
 
(b) The P$ Income Estimates 
That FX$ income estimates are inappropriate for international comparisons of material 
living standards does not mean that the P$ data are flawless, however. One problem is 
that P$ estimates from the International Comparison Program (ICP) have only been 
derived for selected years in what is certainly nowadays a large, although not complete, 
number of countries (about 115 in 1996, but only 16 in 1970) [ICP, 2002]. The estimates 
for other countries (and years), including many of the poorest countries, are 
‘extrapolations’ of unknown reliability. As pointed out by Maddison [1995], different P$ 
per capita income estimates for a country the size of China (not covered in the ICP) vary 
by a factor of three.   9
The international prices used to derive P$ income estimates are ‘simply the 
reciprocal of the purchasing power parity of the US’ [ICP, 2002]. These ‘international’ 
prices, by which goods and services in all countries is valued, hence mirror the 
production structure in the US and the preferences of American consumers. These 
preferences (and prices) do not unambiguously reflect the relative value of goods and 
services in all other countries. Any alternative (equally arbitrary) uniform relative price 
structure would produce a partly different ranking of countries in terms of per-capita 
income. 
A related issue is the fact that the standard P$ income estimates (from the ICP) do 
not take into account that people in poor countries, where the relative price of non-
tradables is low, consume more of these relatively inexpensive items, i.e. they substitute 
such goods for relatively more expensive traded goods. This means that a so-called 
substitution bias is built into the P$ estimates. Dowrick and Akmal [2001] provide 
income estimates corrected for this bias, which suggest smaller inter-national differences 
in incomes than indicated by FX$ income data, but larger than indicated by the P$ data. 
There are many additional, unresolved problems with the P$ estimates from the ICP, such 
as measuring quality differentials of products and valuing non-marketed services 
[Deaton, 2001; Rao, 2002].  
Nonetheless, there is wide agreement that even though the P$ income data contain 
many remaining imperfections, these are more relevant than FX$ data and there is a 
recurrent debate on how they could be improved (see the many papers presented at the 
International Conference on ICP in 2002 [World Bank, 2002b]). It is somewhat 
surprising, however, that very little space has been devoted to assessing the P$ data used   10
throughout the literature on world income distribution. The main exceptions are Dowrick 
and Akmal [2001] and Dikhanov and Ward [2002], who derive income data corrected for 
substitution biaswhile still finding the inter-national income distribution to be largely 
unaltered over time (see also [Dowrick and Quiggin, 1997]). 
 
III. THE DISTRIBUTION MEASURES 
The income distribution measures can broadly be divided into two categories. The first 
set of measures is in the form of ratios of per capita incomes in the ‘richest’ and ‘poorest’ 
countries. The other category comprises measures taking the income distribution over the 
entire range of countries into account.  The Gini coefficient is the most commonly 
employed measure in this category, but also the Theil index, Log-variance, and Squared 
Coefficient of Variation (CV
2) are used (Table 1).
iii   
 
(a)  The Lorentz Curve 
The two sets of measures of income distribution in a population (be it one country or the 
‘world’) can be derived from a Lorentz curve—the unbroken curve L0 in Figure 1. The 
curve traces out the accumulated population’s share of total incomes. In this particular 
example, the curve indicates that the 10 per cent poorest have about 1.5 per cent of total 
incomes, the 20 per cent poorest have 3.5 per cent of total incomes, etc. The curve further 
shows the 10 per cent richest to have half the total incomes (50 per cent). The income 
ratio of, say, the richest 10 per cent in the population to the 10 per cent poorest is hence 
50/1.5 = 33.3. 
                                  [Figure 1 about here].   11
The Gini coefficient can also be derived from the Lorentz curve (Figure 1). If all 
households in a population have the same income, the Lorentz curve will coincide with 
the diagonal, and the Gini takes the value of 0. The more uneven is the income 
distribution, the larger is the Gini coefficient in the interval 0 to 1.0. The coefficient 
would take the maximum value of 1.0 if all incomes went to one household in the 
population. In geometric terms, the Gini coefficient can be calculated as the area (G) 
between the diagonal and the Lorentz curve (the shaded area) in relation to the area of the 
triangle ABC in Figure 1. Quite obviously, the larger the income discrepancies, the larger 
is area G in relation to area ABC— and the higher the value of the Gini coefficient. Gini 
is consequently a comprehensive measure of the degree of unequal distribution, i.e., it 
takes the entire distribution into account (as opposed to the ratio measures). 
 
(b) Income Ratios: Ambiguities and Limitations 
In the studies applying income ratios, two alternative principles have been used for 
delineating ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ groups of countries. In some studies, countries have been 
selected with regard to the size of their population [UNDP, 1999], while this is not the 
case in others [World Bank, 2000/01]. The difference may seem insignificant, but it is 
not.  
  The UNDP calculates the income ratio for the countries with 20 per cent of the 
world population with the highest per capita incomes, and the countries with 20 per cent 
of the world population with the lowest per capita incomes. This ‘rich’ group, with 1.2 
billion people, consists of about 60 countries (according to the World Bank’s P$ 
estimates of per capita income). This group includes the entire Western OECD block as   12
well as a large number of middle income countries, such as Mexico and Poland. The 
weighted (by population size) average per capita income in these 60 countries in 1999 
was approximately P$20,000. The group of poor countries, also with 1.2 billion people, 
includes almost all of Africa south of the Sahara, Indonesia, Pakistan and (the poorer half 
of) India. The weighted average income in this multitudinous collection of countries in 
1999 was about P$1,600. With this delineation of rich and poor countries, the per capita 
income ratio becomes 12.5 (20,000/1,600). 
The alternative method, used by the World Bank [2000/01], is to set the average 
per capita income in the 20 richest countries as a ratio to the per capita income in the 20 
poorest countries, irrespective of population size. The 20 richest countries only had about 
5 per cent of the world’s population in 1999 and so had incidentallythe group of the 
20 poorest countries. The 20 richest countries constitute the upper half in the OECD 
income league together with a few small countries such as Singapore. The (population 
weighted) average per capita income in these 20 countries is about P$28,000. Out of the 
20 poorest countries, 16 are African and the others are Bangladesh, Nepal, North Korea 
and Yemen. The average per capita income in these 20 countries is about P$750. The 
income ratio of rich and poor countries is 37 in this case, i.e. three times as large as in the 
previous alternative (12.5). The delineation of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries hence plays an 
essential role for the size of the resulting income ratio.
iv  
The main advantages of ratio measures—regardless of what income data are used, 
and whether countries are selected according to population size are that they are simple 
to calculate and show the relative difference between the ‘extremes’ (richest versus 
poorest). The ratio measures have clear limitations, however. First, the more narrowly the   13
groups of rich and poor countries are definedas just demonstrated the higher the 
resultant ratio (cet par), and this delineation is often ambiguous. Second, the ratios do not 
take income distribution within the groups of rich and poor countries into account. The 
group of rich countries with jointly 20 per of the world population has per capita incomes 
ranging from about P$7,000 to 38,000. In the group of countries with the 20 per cent 
poorest populations, per capita incomes range from P$350 to approximately 2,000. Third, 
the ratio measures overlook the distribution in (the often large) interval between the ‘rich’ 
and ‘poor’ countries.  
 
(c) Gini Coefficients and Similar Indexes: Ambiguities and Limitations 
Almost all studies using the Gini coefficient (or other comprehensive indexes) and P$ 
income data, find either little change in inter-national income distribution since the 1960s 
or early 1970s, or that the distribution has improved (cf. Table 1). The Gini coefficient 
has the advantage of considering the entire distribution, but suffers from at least three 
limitations. The first is that the Gini coefficient is particularly insensitive to income 
changes in the lowest tail (decile) of the distribution [Pyatt, 1976; Deaton, 2003: 135]. 
Since what occurs in the lowest tail (among the poorest) is often of particular concern, 
this limitation is not negligible. Another limitation is that different distributions can 
produce the same Gini coefficient. A third limitation is that Gini is affected both by 
changes in per capita incomes and in relative population sizes across countries, without 
directly revealing the relative contribution of each factor (although decomposition is 
feasible; see section IV). 
   14
(d) Income Transition 
Both income ratios and Gini coefficients (as well as other comprehensive distribution 
measures) are silent on income transition. That is, an income ratio or a Gini coefficient 
estimated at two different points in time can be exactly the same despite numerous 
countries having changed positions in the income ranking. Considerable transitions have 
in fact occurred, particularly in the top income group (when measured by FX$ income; 
P$ data for 1960 are incomplete). In 1995, the 10 countries with the highest per capita 
incomes in the world only included three countries listed in the top income group in 
1960, namely the US, France and Switzerland [Radetzki and Jonsson, 2001]. The 10 
countries with the lowest per-capita incomes at the same two points in time also differed, 
though not to the same extent. In this group, several African countries are found on both 
occasions. It is not possible to capture ‘transition’ with a measure that can be rendered as 
a single figure. There is, however, a simple graphic method for revealing transition (see 
[Jones, 1997]) and there is also the transition-matrices method designed by Quah [1996] 
and used by Bourguignon and Morrison [2002] and many others.  
 
IV. POPULATION GROWTH  
Population growth has in general been most rapid in the least developed countries and 
slowest in the richest countries. This variation in population growth has had a significant 
influence on the development of inter-national income distribution as estimated by 
Gini coefficients over time. As a simple illustration of the importance of population 
growth for distribution, we shall investigate how the income distribution between two 
countries—the US and India—changed between 1960 and 1999. Table 2 cites total GDP   15
and population in the two countries, as well as their shares of joint income and population 
in the respective year. Since income and population growth were higher in India than in 
the US over this period, there was an increase in India’s share of both joint income and 
population. The Gini coefficients and Lorentz curves for the two years are reported in 
Table 2 and Figure 2, respectively.  
         [Table 2 about here] 
  Figure 2 shows that the Lorentz curve shifted positions between the two years as a 
result of the changed shares of total incomes and population. India’s increased share of 
the joint income contributed to even out the distribution between the two countries, while 
it was skewed by the country’s growing share of the joint population. Incidentally, the 
two effects cancelled out, leaving Gini unchanged at 0.58 (Table 2). The general 
interpretation in the growth literature would be that since India’s per capita income grew 
faster than that of the US, India ‘caught up’ and ‘convergence’ took place. This example 
further demonstrates the second limitation of the Gini mentioned above, viz. that two 
different distributions (Lorentz curves) can produce exactly the same Gini coefficient. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Firebaugh [1999] calculated (or rather simulated) the relative influence on Gini of 
changes in per capita incomes, relative to changes in population size across 120 countries 
over the 1960-1989 period. He found that had the population shares remained unchanged 
at the 1960 values (cet par), Gini would have increased by 9.5 percentage points up to 
1989while in fact remaining largely unchanged. During this period, therefore, 
differences in population growth ensured that inter-country income distribution did not 
change (despite diverging per-capita incomes).   16
 
V. THE TIME DIMENSIONS  
(a) Comparison of Individual Years versus Time-series Estimates  
Some studies have estimated changes in inter-national income distribution by comparing 
distribution measures obtained for two particular years (e.g. [UNDP, 1999; IBRD, 
2000/01; Jones, 1997; Radetzki and Jonsson, 2001]). This procedure is labour saving, but 
can skew the results if the two selected years are not representative. All these studies take 
1960 as their initial year. Schultz [1998], who estimated annual Gini coefficients over the 
1960-89 period, found that the estimated distribution in 1960 was unusually even and 
hence, unrepresentative. Moreover, this study, as well as some others (e.g. [Melchior et 
al., 2000]), reveal a slightly falling trend since the mid 1960s, but also marked annual 
fluctuations. This begs the question of the statistical significance of the trend; an issue not 
addressed by the authors, but they are amenably cautious in not overinterpreting their 
results. The conclusion is nonetheless that studies producing time series distribution 
estimates are more dependable than those comparing two arbitrarily selected years.  
Also the final year varies across the studies based on PPP-adjusted income data. 
Most investigations end in the late 1980s or early 1990s; only three take us to 1998 or 
1999 [Melchior et al., 2000; Sala-i-Martin, 2002; Boltho and Toniolo, 1999]. The first 
two studies report a smooth decline in inter-country Gini by an accumulated 0.03 points 
during the 1990s. The latter finds Gini to have declined by 0.02 points between the two 
years 1990 and 1998. With the Gini distribution measure, there is hence no sign of a 
pending deterioration in the inter-country relative income distribution.
v  
   17
(b)  The Long Time Perspective 
The main reason why many studies take a year in the 1960s as their starting point is that 
this was the time when the reasonably comparable (P$) income data were first produced 
for most developing countries [ICP, 2002; Maddison, 1995]. Despite the data 
intractability, a few studies have derived estimates of inter-country income distribution 
stretching back to 1820 [Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002], 1870 [Pritchett, 1997], or 
1900 [Boltho and Toniolo, 1999]. The historical (PPP-adjusted) income data are mainly 
taken from Maddison [1995]. The fact that historical income data are only available for a 
handful of today’s poor countries has been handled differently.
vi  Bourguignon and 
Morrisson lump countries into 33 groups. Within the groups, all countries are assumed to 
have the same (historical) per capita income and distribution as a ‘similar’ country in the 
group for which data could be obtained. Boltho and Toniolo constrain their analysis to 
the limited number of countries (49) for which Maddison [1995] provides data. Pritchett 
extrapolates backwards from current incomes to a minimum per capita income level that 
he finds to be the lowest possible for survival in a population (about P$250 in 1985 
prices, or P$480 in 1999 prices)
vii.  
  Despite differences in methodology and the distribution measures employed, the 
three studies arrive at a unison result: the inter-national income distribution deteriorated 
sharply up to about the mid 1960s and then levelled off. This result, ‘divergence, big 
time’ to borrow Pritchett’s expression, can hardly be questioned despite the unreliable 
and scanty data. No other outcome can be expected, considering the very low per capita 
income of the great majority of poor countries, including populous India and China, in 
the 1960s, when the first per-capita income estimates for most of them came forth   18
[Maddison, 1995]. These low per capita incomes, in the P$250-550 (in 1985 PPP prices) 
range, imply that growth in previous periods must have been very modest, if at all 
positive. The now richest countries enjoyed a five-fold increase in real per-capita income 
(some even more) between 1870 and 1950 [Maddison, 1995]. With such spread in growth 
rates, inter-national income distribution must simply deteriorate. 
 
VI.  GLOBAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION  
The issues discussed so far have been inter-country income distribution and changes 
therein. In a number of studies, the authors further attempt to estimate the ‘global’ 
income distribution, i.e. taking both the distribution across and within countries into 
consideration [Dowrick and Akmal, 2001; Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002; Dikhanov 
and Ward, 2002; Sala-i-Martin, 2002]. These studies are based on P$ income data 
originating from national accounts. The within-country distributions are estimated with 
different methods and levels of disaggregation. The first study rely on the quintile data 
from Deininger and Squire [1996]. Bourguignon and Morrisson, as well as Dikhanov and 
Ward, use decile income estimates from household expenditure/income surveys. Sala-i-
Martin estimates a gaussian kernel density function, allowing him to disaggregate intra-
country quintile income distribution down to the household level in each country. Gini is 
the main distribution measure applied (but Theil and LogVar are also used).  
With due acknowledgement of the paucity and low quality of the data on  internal 
income distribution in the majority of the developing countries, these studies find (1) the 
global income distribution to be more uneven than the inter-national distribution (the 
latter accounts for about 70-85 per cent of the global inequality) and (2) that the global   19
distribution has remained relatively stable since the 1960s (a change in Gini by ± 0.02 
points). Going back to 1820, Bourguignon and Morrisson [2002] estimate global income 
distribution to have deteriorated sharply up to the 1960s, but to have levelled off since 
then.  
Milanovic [2002] is the first study of global income distribution based on a 
completely different income data set, viz. household income/expenditure data from 216 
country surveys in 1988 and 1993. There is a remarkable similarity with the degree of 
global inequality he finds and what is reported for the same years by the one study based 
on national account income data [Sala-i-Martin, 2002]. In both studies, the global 
distribution in 1988, as measured by Gini, is estimated at 0.63. The estimates of global 
inequality levels hence seem robust to the choice of the income database. However, the 
two studies find different developments up to 1993. Sala-i-Martin reports a decline in 
global Gini by 0.02 points, while Milanovic finds an increase of 0.03 points (to 0.66). 
With the Theil index, the divergence in results is even more pronounced. 
Space does not allow the reasons for these conflicting results to be examined in 
detail. Nevertheless, the use of different income data and definitions of countries is 
central for this controversy. Milanovic divided five populous countries, including China, 
Bangladesh and India, into two observations by treating the rural and urban populations 
as two separate ‘countries’. He further decomposed the change in the global Gini 
coefficient geographically and found that ‘the main factors underlying the increase in 
[global] inequality between 1988 and 1993...[were] slower [economic] growth in rural 
areas in large South Asian countries (India and Bangladesh) and in rural China compared 
to several OECD countries’ [Milanovic, 2002: 85]. That is, the increase in global   20
inequality reported in this study was mainly due to increased intra-country inequality 
(between urban and rural areas) in large Asian countries.
viii   
No one seems to challenge the notion that intra-country income distribution in 
both China and India has become increasingly unequal since these countries started to 
grow notably around 1980 and 1990, respectively [Ravallion, 2001; Deaton, 2001]. It has 
also been observed, however, that income growth in China and India (and several other 
developing countries) is considerably lower when estimated from the household surveys 
(HS) used by Milanovic, than when estimated on the basis of national account (NA) data.  
The high income growth rates for China and (less so) India, reported in the 
national accounts, have had an equalising effect on global income distribution as 
estimated by Sala-i-Martin [2002].
ix This equalising effect on global distribution has 
swamped the unequalising effect of widening income disparities within these two 
countries. In Milanovic’s study, it is the other way around. Here, the small effect on 
global income distribution of the lower income growth in China and India suggested by 
the HS data used, has been dominated by the large unequalising effect of the deterioration 
in internal income distribution in these countries (cf. the above citation). It should be 
recalled that jointly, the two countries have almost half (2.3 billion) of the population in 
all developing countries (5 billion). The different data used to estimate income growth 
and distribution in these two countries thus have a profound effect on the estimated world 
income distribution (by Gini and related measures). 
It is further notable that the two years covered by Milanovic (1988 and 1993) are 
too close to allow a firm conclusion regarding long-term trends. The annual Gini 
estimates of global inequality, derived on the basis of NA data in other studies (e.g.   21
[Melchior et al., 2000]), show short-term fluctuations in Gini of  ±0.02-0.03 points. It 
will hence be interesting to see the update to 1998 of Milanovic’s study that is under 
preparation.  Assuming, however, that the estimated increase in Gini by Milanovic is not 
a temporary, but a sustained, phenomenon, is an increase in Gin by 0.03 points large or 
small? Milanovic [2002: 72] argues that it is ‘very high’, making comparisons with 
estimated changes in individual countries renowned for increased inequality (the US, 
United Kingdom, China and Chile). However, he himself offers an indirect significance 
test (in footnote 16), suggesting the estimated difference in Gini coefficient between the 
two years to be statistically insignificant (as the 95 per cent confidence intervals for 1988 




VII. THE BASE DATA  
It is not possible to say whether Milanovic’s income data from HS are more or less 
reliable and relevant than the NA-based income data used by Sala-i-Martin (and most 
others). Both data sets are contaminated with measurement errors and omissions, and the 
population data employed throughout the literature may also be biased. 
 
(a) The Income Data 
The national account data on per capita GDP (whether PPP-adjusted or not), used as a 
proxy for income in most studies, may contain large systematic distortions (bias). 
According to the World Bank estimates, per capita income (P$500-700) in the absolutely 
poorest countries in 1999 by a tiny margin exceeded what is needed for pure survival in a   22
population, estimated by Pritchett [1997] to be around P$480 in 1999 prices. This may be 
a statistical delusion. Most likely, the incomes recorded in the national accounts in poor 
countries are incomplete, one of the reasons being that the indirect incomes generated in 
the agricultural subsistence sector are systematically underestimated [Heston, 1994]. The 
production and incomes in other informal (and illegal) sectors are also underreported. 
There are investigations (of necessity based on defective data) which estimate the 
unreported incomes in many poor countries to correspond to as much as 50-65 per cent of 
the national account incomes [Schneider and Enste, 2000]. 
It is likely, however, that per capita income has been underestimated also in the 
richest countries. By now, it is widely agreed that inflation has been overestimated over a 
long period of time, thereby signifying that real income growth has been underestimated. 
This finding is reported in several studies from the US, based on two completely different 
estimation methods [Boskin et al., 1997; Hamilton, 2001; Costa, 2001; Hausman, 2003]. 
The net effect of the underestimation of incomes in both poor and rich countries on world 
income distribution is impossible to ascertain, but the absolute incomes in the poorest 
countries are very likely to be underestimated. 
The multitudinous household surveys used by Milanovic have been conducted 
with varying methods, coverage and scrutiny, and are acknowledged by the author to be 
of uneven quality [Milanovic, 2002: 56-57]. It is also well known that most household 
surveys suffer from methodological inadequacies and that reported income data are often 
seriously flawed [Ravallion, 2001; Deaton, 2003]. This is particularly the case in poor 
developing countries, where expenditures are usually estimated by recalls over such long 
periods (e.g. 30 days) that many items are long forgotten by the respondents (see Deaton   23
[2001] for further discussion). Even in the rich OECD countries, where much more 
sophisticated estimation technologies are used, household surveys provide shaky income 
data [Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001]. It is hence not possible to infer that HS data are 
generally more accurate, and produce more reliable estimates of world income 
distribution, than NA data. This yet remains an open question. 
The choice between NA and HS data must primarily be dictated from what 
incomes they capture and exclude. The NA data include some incomes that do not accrue 
to individuals and are hence not used for private consumption (e.g. investments and 
consumption by governments and non-profit organisations). Conceptually, it would be 
more satisfying to measure income by the private consumption expenditure part of total 
incomes. This has not been done in any study, presumably because these estimates, often 
derived as a residual in the national accounts, are notoriously unreliable. The HS data 
include a larger share of subsistence incomes, but exclude non-private expenditures 
(some of which have a direct bearing on individual welfare, such as public schooling and 
health care). Considering these and many other differences in income coverage (see 
Ravallion [2001] and Deaton [2001; 2003] for further discussions), it is remarkable that 
the estimates of the level of global income inequality based on NA and HS data, 
respectively, match so well (at least for 1988; cf. above).  
 
(b) The Population Data  
Quite recently, the World Bank undertook a drastic revision of its published population 
data (based on data from national statistical offices and the UN). A comparison between 
the two World Development Reports [World Bank, 1999/00, 2000/01: tables 3], shows   24
that world population growth was revised downward by about 40 per cent for the 1980s, 
and 13 per cent for the 1990s. This must be the most radical statistical revision ever 
completed for an indicator as important as population growth. Strangely enough, no 
comment whatsoever of the underlying reasons is provided by the World Bank [2000/01], 
but the revisions can be traced to the large revision of all population data that the UN 
recently undertook [UN, 2000]. Nonetheless, the studies of income distribution referred 
to earlier have been based on the, obviously incorrect, unrevised population statistics. If 
these data are highly misleading, and differently so for individual countries, as indicated 
by the World Bank revision, this must have distorted the estimates of world income 
distribution to a large, although unquantified, extent.  
 
(c) Supplementary Indicators of Differences in Living Standards 
The studies hitherto referred to have measured inter-country and global distribution in 
terms of per capita income, which many consider to be an incomplete indicator of living 
standards. There are studies making international comparisons in other dimensions of 
welfare (e.g. [Crafts, 1999; Easterly, 1999; 2001; Easterlin, 2000]). It is not within the 
scope of this article to assess this considerable body of literature but it seems that when 
some alternative indicators, such as life expectancy at birth and literacy, are consulted, 
there is a convergence across countries over time (see also [Schultz, 1998; Melchior et 
at., 2000; Sala-i-Martin, 2002; Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002]).  
 
VII.  RELATIVE VERSUS ABSOLUTE INCOME DISTRIBUTION   25
When estimating poverty, it has become standard to report both relative shares and 
absolute numbers, or head counts (see, for instance, [World Bank, 2000/01; Chen and 
Ravallion, 2001; Sala-i-Martin, 2002]). This is not the case when assessing income 
distribution in the world, however. All investigations covered in Table 1 have used 
different measures of relative income distribution (e.g. ratios and Gini). How the absolute 
income distribution across countries and globally has changed over time is largely 
ignored in the entire growth-cum-distribution literature. Dikhanov and Ward [2002] 
provide a table with estimated absolute income changes by income deciles over time, 
which we shall exploit below, but they do not elaborate the theme.
xi 
 
 (a) Relative vs Absolute Global Income Distribution Since 1970 
In Figure 3, the absolute incomes of the world population by income deciles are shown 
for the two years 1970 and 1999 (as estimated by Dikhanov and Ward [2002: Table 2]). 
We see that most of the total growth in absolute incomes (in fact, 70 per cent) has taken 
place in the top decile (10th), where OECD populations account for about 85 per cent. 
The relative income growth has been highest in the 2nd to 5th deciles (numbers in italics 
on top of each bar), but the joint share of these deciles of absolute income growth is only 
11 per cent (while most of the remaining 19 per cent accrued to the 9th decile). I have 
also inserted estimates from the same study of the most commonly used indicators of 
relative distribution, Gini and Theil, in Figure 3. These indicate a largely unaltered 
(relative) income distribution (and the estimates are quite similar to those derived in other 
studies for the same or close years; see Table 1).  
    [Figure  3  about  here]   26
 
(b) Inevitable Widening Absolute Income Gaps 
While the relative world income distribution may not have changed much over recent 
decades and stands a chance of remaining relatively stable in the near future (see section 
X below), we can be completely certain that absolute income gaps will continue to grow 
for at least one or two generations. To illustrate this, we return to the earlier example with 
the income distribution between India and the US. As reported in Table 2, there was an 
improvement in the (relative) income ratio between the two countries between 1960 and 
1999, but when measured by Gini, the distribution remained unchanged. When the 
absolute income gap is employed as a third distribution indicator, the result is a 
deterioration in the distribution (from P$13,185 to 28,450). The question is: How long 
will it take before India’s per capita income starts to converge with that of America in 
absolute terms? 
First an optimistic scenario: we postulate that India’s per capita income growth 
will be a steady 6 per cent in the years to come (about 2 percentage points higher than 
during the 1990s), while it remains at 2 per cent in the US. In 20 years time, the per 
capita income in India will reach P$7,180, and increase in relative terms to 15.5 per cent 
of that in the US (Table 3, scenario 1). The absolute gap, however, will widen to about 
P$39,180. The outcome is a convergence of relative per capita incomes, but a divergence 
of absolute incomes.  
  In this scenario, the per capita income in India in the middle of the present century 
(P$41,260) will, by far, have surpassed the 2000 income in the US (P$31,200). 
Furthermore, the ratio of per capita incomes has increased to 49 per cent. Yet, the   27
absolute gap in per capita income has grown to P$42,740. In this example, a decrease in 
the absolute gap will not appear until around 2050. It will hence take half a century—or 
close to two generations—before the absolute difference in per capita income begins to 
close, even if India’s income were to grow three times faster than that of the US (Figure 
4, upper panel). In a less optimistic scenario, where the postulated future annual per 
capita income growth in India is more moderate (3 per cent), but still higher than in the 
US (2 per cent), the absolute income gap will continue to grow far into the 22nd century 
(Figure 4, lower panel).   
[Figure 4 about here] 
  One can also look back in time and confirm that with a high annual per capita 
income growth, about 6 per cent, it has de facto been possible for a small number of 
countries to go from relative poverty to absolute incomes measuring up to those in 
Europe and the US over a span of 40 years. In 1960, Korea and Singapore had estimated 
per capita P$ incomes of 9 and 23 per cent, respectively, of that in the US. At the time, 
Korea’s per capita income was on the same level as that of many African countries. Some 
40 years later, per capita income in Korea was at par with that of southern Europe, and 
about 10 times higher than in the majority of African countries. In the late 1990s, per 
capita incomes in Singapore and the US were about the same [World Bank, 2000/01]. 
  What these simple ‘compounded-interest examples’ demonstrate is that for the 
absolute per capita income gap to start to close within the life time of the children born 
today, extraordinary growth rates are required in today’s poorest countries—growth rates 
which only a few countries (Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) have thus far been able to 
maintain over long periods (see also endnote viii).    28
 
(c) What is Most Important? 
One can always discuss whether the gap between poor and rich countriesbe it relative 
or absoluteis the most important, or if the level of per capita income in the now poorest 
countries is of greater importance. Many considerations suggest the latter. If a country 
like India can grow at a steady rate of 6 per cent per year, it will reach a per capita 
income of about P$10,000 within one generation (27 years), which is roughly half of the 
present average European income. This income level would be sufficient for the 
elimination of the worst consequences of current poverty in India: widespread under- and 
malnutrition, very high levels of child mortality and illiteracy extending over almost half 
of the population [Fogel, 1999; Svedberg, 2000]. It is also an income that would permit a 
general level of consumption four times higher than at present. With a per capita growth 
rate of 2 per cent, the average growth of India since its independence in 1950, this will 
take about 75 years.  
 
(d) Possible Consequences of a Continued Widening of Absolute Income Gaps 
It is somewhat misleading to present a higher per capita income growth rate in poor than 
in rich countries as ‘income convergence’ without reservation, as is routinely done in the 
growth-cum-distribution literature. A passage from Sala-i-Martin [2002: 36], one of the 
leading analysts in this field, is symptomatic: ‘As China and India grew, the incomes of 
their numerous citizens tended to converge to those of the citizens of the rich world.’ 
Sure enough, if an initially very poor country has a persistently higher per capita income 
growth than a rich country, its absolute per capita incomes will start to converge at some   29
time in the future. As just demonstrated, this may take several generations with the 
growth rates accomplished by poor countries so far and meanwhile, the absolute per-
capita income gaps will inevitably widen.  
Although the level of income in countries may be the most important aspect of 
development, the absolute gaps should not be ignored. One reason to pay more attention 
to absolute differences in incomes between countries is a normative ‘global perspective 
of justness’ [UNDP, 1999]. The one-sided emphasis on relative measures is one of the 
main reasons why economists have such difficulties in establishing a constructive 
dialogue with anti-globalisation activists and others primarily concerned with absolute 
differences [Kanbur, 2002]. In addition, there may be adverse consequences related to 
widening absolute income gaps that are overlooked. I will briefly mention, just as 
examples, three such possible consequences.  
First, widening absolute income gaps may tempt the elite in the poorest countries 
to push for ever more unequal economic policies. In today’s world, the highly educated in 
each and every country have access to the same information about the conditions in other 
countries. There is hence a risk that the elites in poor countries will increasingly identify 
themselves with the populations in the richest countries and ‘demand’ the same standard 
of living (absolute income). In low income countries, such demands can, in the short and 
medium term, only be met by a redistribution from the large majority of poor to the elite 
itself. 
Second, widening the absolute income gaps across countries will create increased 
incentives for migration of both educated and unskilled labour from poor to rich 
countries. The migration of the educated is tantamount to a brain drain from poor   30
countries and the dilution of already scant human capital, a crucial determinant of 
growth. Migration of unskilled labour from poor countries is something rich countries 
obviously want to regulate (to relatively low levels), and which de facto is often illegal 
(e.g. trafficking) and connected with other criminal activities. 
Third, it is not inconceivable that growing absolute income gaps will lead to 
increased political tension between countries and an elevated risk of conflicts and wars. 
So far, research into this type of problems has primarily focused on relative income 
differences within countries (e.g. [Collier and Hoeffler, 1998]).  
 
IX. PAST DEVELOPMENTS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
(a) Measurements and Methods 
No single measure can provide a completely unambiguous answer to the question of 
whether income distribution across countries, or globally, has become more or less 
unequal in recent decades. Income and distribution are concepts that can be defined and 
measured in a number of ways and the basic income and population data at hand are 
flawed in various dimensions. 
We have concluded, though, that FX$ incomes are less comparable across 
countries than P$ incomes. Studies solely based on FX$ incomes [UNDP, 1999; 
Korceniewicz and Moran, 1997] must consequently be interpreted with scepticism. The 
P$ incomes tend to underestimate differences across countries [Dowrick and Akmal, 
2001], but are nowadays widely considered to be more to the mark.  
  When it comes to distribution indices, the choice must be based on the question 
posed. If the question is how the distribution of income between the very richest and   31
poorest countries has evolved, an income ratio can be useful. When the entire distribution 
over all countries is the concern, comprehensive measures, such as the Gini coefficient, 
are warranted. Both sets of measures, however, have their limitations (p. 9 above).  
Moreover, all estimates of changes in income distribution, irrespective of the 
income and distribution measures employed, are sensitive to which years are chosen for 
the investigation. The use of time series data for long periods is preferable to 
comparisons between two arbitrarily selected years. Furthermore, we have found it rather 
dubious to estimate (changes in) inter-national income distribution with measures not 
taking countries’ population size into consideration.
xii 
Finally, there is the question of which basic income data are the most reliable and 
relevant, data from national accounts or household surveys. Both data sets are 
contaminated with measurement errors and there is yet no possibility to judge their 
relative reliability. The two data sets capture different incomes and without invoking 
normative judgement, it is not feasible to say which of these incomes are the most 
relevant proxies of well-being. Preferably, they should be used as two non-rival 
alternatives. 
 
(b) World Income Distribution: Which Way? 
Despite ambiguities in the choice of income and distribution measures, certain 
conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the assembled results in the available 
investigations. The conclusions presented below are primarily based on the studies that 
have employed (1) income measures adjusted for PPP, (2) weighted countries by 
population size, and (3) have used time series data.   32
   The first conclusion is that since the 1960s, the relative inter-national distribution 
of income, as measured by Gini and other comprehensive indicators, has remained rather 
stable. Most of the about 10 studies providing estimates for a long period, based on P$ 
income data, have found a decline in the -0.02to -0.05 interval. A few studies have 
estimated global distribution, i.e. also taking intra-country distribution into consideration, 
and found it to be more uneven than inter-national distribution. Most of these studies also 
suggest that global relative distribution has remained largely unaltered over the past few 
decades (a change in the ±0.02-0.03 range ). We can hence conclude that ‘divergence, big 
time’, which undoubtedly took place up to the mid 1960s, has come to a halt. 
The relatively unchanged Gini coefficient conceals, however, that two 
contradictory forces have by and large neutralised each other. The relative spread in PPP-
adjusted per capita income has increased, but changes in countries’ population shares 
have had offsetting effects, leaving Gini and other comprehensive measures relatively 
stable [Firebaugh, 1999: Table B1]. There are also important transitions lurking behind 
the largely constant Gini coefficient. Rapidly growing incomes in several middle-income 
countries (mainly in Southeast Asia) have contributed to a more unequal total 
distribution.
xiii  
As noted by several authors, China’s impact on world income distribution is of 
paramount importance because of the sheer size of its population (approaching 1.3 
billion). It is hence important to recall that the reliability of the Chinese economic data 
leaves much to desire (see endnote ix). The decline in inter-national and global income 
inequality reported by Melchior et al. [2000], Sala-i-Martin [2002] and some other 
studies, is to a large extent the result of high growth in initially poor China, as reported in   33
national account data (even when modified). Melanovic’s [2002] finding that global 
income distribution has deteriorated (over a short period) is also mainly due to China. His 
results are chiefly driven by the use of income data from household surveys, which report 
much lower income growth rates, not only in rural China (with some 800 million people), 
but also in the other two initially poor populous rural countries in Asia, India and 
Bangladesh. Until we are able to more affirmatively gauge income growth and 
distribution in China, there will be remaining doubt  on the direction in which world 
relative income distribution has changed in recent times (if at all). 
A final conclusion regarding inter-country distribution is that there has been a 
marked increase in the relative difference in per-capita income between the absolutely 
poorest countries, almost all in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the richest countries (primarily 
within the OECD area), since the 1960s. This is shown most clearly by investigations 
based on income ratio measures, but also by those using comprehensive distribution 
measures, such as Gini (e.g. [Melchior et al., 2000; Sala-i-Martin, 2002]). As noted in 
several studies, the lack of growth in most African countries should be the main concern, 
not only for world income distribution, but considering the sharply increasing poverty. 
According to the estimate by Sala-i-Martin [2002: 39], in 1998, the African countries 
‘account for over 95 per cent of the world’s poor.’ 
In sum, the most striking differences in the various estimates of changes in world 
income distribution have been reasonably well identified here, but the more subtle 
differences need more exploration. One such question is why investigations based on 
income data from national accounts [Sala-i-Martin, 2002] and household surveys 
[Milanovic, 2002], respectively, show global income distribution to evolve in different   34
directions (over a short period). A tentative answer to this puzzle has been offered here 
(pp. 14-15), but further investigation is clearly required. There are also minor differences 
in estimated Gini coefficients, and changes therein, across studies that we have not 
explained. Considering that the various studies differ slightly in terms of the countries 
and years covered, and many other subtleties, these minor differences cannot be 
explained. This would require access to a complete and unflawed data set, encompassing 
all data applied in various individual studies. 
 
X. WHAT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS ARE LIKELY? 
A main reason why relative inter-country income distribution, as measured by Gini and 
related measures, has remained largely unaltered in recent decades is notable changes in 
countries’ shares of the world population [Firebaugh, 1999]. How the future relative 
distribution of incomes across countries will develop hence depends partly on the per 
capita economic growth that the respective groups of countries will manage to 
accomplish, and partly on relative population growth. If incomes in the now poorest 
countries are to grow faster than those in other countries, there will be an improvement in 
the relative income distribution. But if the poorest countries continue to account for 
rapidly expanding shares of the world population, this will tend to make the relative 
distribution more uneven. The question is hence what population and per capita income 
growth can be expected in coming decades. 
 
(a) Population Forecasts   35
On average, the richest countries have had considerably lower population growth rates 
than the poor countries, but the trend is towards decreasing differences. According to the 
revised data from the World Bank [2000/01], the ratio of annual population growth in the 
low and middle income countries and the high income countries (per capita income in 
1999 above P$9,200) declined from 1.9/0.6 in the 1980s to 1.6/0.6 in the 1990s. A not too 
daring prognosis is that the difference in the population growth rate between poor and 
rich countries will continue to decrease in the future [UN, 2000]. Thus, there will be a 
smaller impact of changes in population shares on Gini and related distribution 
indicators. Consequently, differences in per capita income growth will be of increasing 
importance for how the (relative) distribution of income across countries will develop in 
years to come.  
 
(b) Expected Growth in Per Capita Real Income 
Economic growth theory does not provide much guidance, since the innumerable 
theoretical models developed in recent years predict divergent outcomes when it comes to 
growth in countries with different initial per capita income. The neo-classical Solow 
[1956] model, as well as some more recent (endogenous) growth models, predict 
convergence or neutrality (e.g. [Lucas, 1988]). Other models predict divergence, i.e. that 
the already rich countries will grow more rapidly than the poor (e.g. [Romer, 1990]) and 
that relative income distribution will thereby become more skewed with time.  
Empirical research reveals a relatively strong correlation between a low initial 
income level and subsequent slow growth across countries (see [Temple, 1999] for a 
review).  To explain this, some economists have found ‘inherent’ disadvantages for the   36
poorest countries. Sachs and Werner [1997] primarily emphasise a tropical climate and 
high morbidity which reduce peoples’ labour productivity and shorten their life spans. 
They have also identified other fixed growth deterrents, such as adverse natural 
preconditions for agriculture and geographical disadvantages in the form of long 
distances to the most important export markets. Other economists have interpreted the 
available empirical evidence differently and argued that the main reasons why growth has 
been lower in the poor countries are deficiencies in their basic institutions, such as non-
democratic regimes, widespread corruption and lax legal systems for ensuring property 
rights.  Sala-i-Martin [1997] and many others also find support for the notion that many 
of these countries have pursued misguided economic policies. 
In case the inherent disadvantages are the most important, the unavoidable 
conclusion is grim when it comes to expected future relative inter-country income 
distribution. On the other hand, if inadequate institutions and misdirected economic 
policies are the main hurdles for growth in the poorest countries, there is at least some 
hope for change—and thus for a more favourable development of future relative income 
distribution in the world. 
 
(c) Inevitable Widening Absolute Income Gaps 
It is indeed hazardous to predict future economic growth in different groups of countries 
and population projections are also uncertain. It is therefore almost impossible to forecast 
how inter-country income distribution in relative terms will develop in years to come—as 
measured by income ratios or Gini coefficients. What we can predict with complete 
certainty, however, is that the absolute per capita income gap between the richest and the   37
poorest countries will inexorably continue to grow over the next two to three decades. 
There are no signs that economic growth in the rich countries is grinding to a halt, or 
even slowing down. This means that although the poorest countries may manage to 
increase their per capita growth rates to the level thus far proven to be the highest 
possible (about 6 per cent annually for a long period), the absolute income gap will 
continue to widen for several decades. If today’s poor countries ‘only’ manage to grow a 
couple of percentage points quicker than the rich nations, there will be no decline in the 
absolute income gaps until some time in the 22nd century. 
The nowadays comprehensive literature on income distribution in the world has 
almost exclusively focused on relative distribution. All the most conventional indicators 
(ratios and Gini) measure distribution in relative terms. To pay more heed to the growing 
absolute income gaps between rich and poor countries, and their consequences, seems an 
urgent task for future research into growth and distribution. 
 
                                                           
i Li et al. [1998] test the determinants of differences in the Gini coefficient on a panel of 166 observations 
from 49 countries. Their main finding is that credit constraints for the poor, which stifle their ability to 
invest in physical and human capital, constitute the chief explanation for high inequality. See also Aghion 
et al. [1999]. 
ii   For other purposes, FX$ income measures may be more relevant, e.g. for ‘assessing a nation’s capacity 
to repay foreign debt or its bargaining power in international trade negotiations’ [Dowrick and Akmal, 
2001:2] 
iii   See Firebaugh [1999: 1606-09] for an elucidating demonstration of how these rather similar measures 
can be derived from one and the same general formula for income distribution.  
iv  It should be noted that I have used the same P$ income data in both examples in order to highlight the 
difference induced by delineating rich and poor countries differently, holding other variables constant. The 
UNDP itself uses FX$ income data in its estimations (see above).   38
                                                                                                                                                                             
v   Dikhanov and Ward [2002], employing income data corrected for substitution bias and the Theil index, 
find inter-country distribution to have deteriorated between the two years 1990 and 1999 (Theil increasing 
from 0.61 to 0.64). 
vi  Scanty income data is not the only problem when it comes to estimating changes in inter-national 
income distribution over long periods of time. Most of the countries of today (about 210) did not exist as 
nation-states a hundred years ago. Almost all of Africa was colonised and the majority of the countries in 
the Middle East were provinces in the Ottoman Empire. Prior to 1950, India included what are today 
Pakistan and Bangladesh (which then separated from Pakistan in 1971). A later, but similar, measurement 
problem is that after 1990, the Soviet Union split into some 25 countries without individual ‘statistical 
histories’. This was one of the reasons why Schultz [1998] and Firebaugh [1999] used 1989 as the terminal 
year in their respective studies. Most other studies simply exclude the former Soviet republics. 
vii  In an attempt to update the World Bank’s original 1P$-a-day poverty line (P$365 per year) to its 1999 
equivalent, Dikhanov and Ward [2002] arrive at P$700. With this inter-temporal ‘PPP-exchange rate’, 
P$250 in 1985 correspond to about P$480 in 1999. 
viii   According to table 23 in Milanovic’s [2002] study, the combined inequality-increasing effect of low 
growth in rural China and India, and overall in Bangladesh, as compared to higher growth in the US and 
other large OECD countries, on global income deterioration accounted for 0.03 Gini points. That is, the 
entire net increase in global Gini reported by Milanovic can be explained by the estimated low growth in 
the rural areas in these populous Asian countries. It is further notable that in Milanovic’s tables (19-23), 
reporting on the relative contribution of inter- and intra-country changes, respectively, to global distribution 
(i.e. changes in overall Gini), the growing inequality between urban and rural areas in the large Asian 
countries is counted as inter-country, not intra-country, effects. 
ix  There is widespread disbelief in the extraordinarily high growth rates reported in Chinese official 
documents. According to these estimates, China has had an annual GDP growth rate of about 10 per cent 
since 1980 [World Bank, 2000/01: Table 11]. Few seem to believe this number to be reliable and 
alternative estimates have been provided.  The official growth number has been scaled down by Sala-i-
Martin [2002], as well as by Dikhanov and Ward [2002], to the more modest, although still high, growth 
rate estimated by Maddison [1998].  
x   Another way of judging whether a change in Gini by 0.03 points is large or small is to look at the 
variation in Gini across developing countries, which ranges from about 0.30 to well above 0.60 [World 
Bank, 2000/01]. 
xi  Also Pritchett [1997] and Radetzki and Jonson [2001] present data on absolute income disparities across 
countries, but do not explore the developments and consequences. 
xii  In other endeavours, such as estimating determinants of income growth differences across countries in 
growth regressions, where each country is one unit of observation, unweighted income data are preferable. 
xiii  A further observation, not discussed in this study, is the strong convergence of incomes that has taken 
place within the OECD block [Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997].   39
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b) Years expressed as 1960-1995 mean that distribution estimates have been derived for each year within 
the period. Years expressed as 1960/1995 mean income distribution estimates for these two years and years 
expressed as 1970//1998 mean that three or more individual years within this time span have been covered. 
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articles, several additional comprehensive distribution indices are also applied (e.g. LogVar and CV
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d) All studies (except 6 and 13; see these entries) use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in constant 
dollars as the proxy for per capita income. FX$ means that income in US dollars has been converted by 
current exchange rates (FX). P$ means that income data have been adjusted for purchasing power parity 
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TABLE 2 
TOTAL GDP AND POULATION IN INDIA AND THE US IN 1960 AND 1999 
ASOLUTE AND RELATIVE INCOME DISTRIBUTION (MAIN INDICATORS IN BOLD) 
 
  Total GDP  
(1999 P$ billion) 
Total population 
(million) 
GDP per cap. 
(1999 P$) 
Annual growth 1960-
99 (per cent per year) 
  1960 1999 1960 1999  1960 1999 GDP  Pop  GDP/c 
 
                                   Absolute numbers 
India       369    2,144     452     998        815     2,150  4.5  2.0  2.5 
US    2,560    8,350     183     273   14,000   30,600  3.0  1.0  2.0 
   Total    2,929  10,494     635  1,271  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
   Gap (India-US)  ..  ..  ..  ..  -13,185 -28,450 .. ..  .. 
 
                                    Per cent distribution 
India         13         20         71      78  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
US         87         80         29      22  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
   Total       100       100       100    100  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
   Ratio (India/US)  ..  ..  ..  ..       5.8       7.0  .. ..  .. 
Gini  coefficient  .. .. .. ..      0.58     0.58  .. ..  .. 
 
Sources: Total GDP and size of population in 1999 are from the World Bank [2000/01: tables 1 and 11]. 
The rates of growth of GDP and population are derived from various issues of the World Development 
Report and are rounded, approximative numbers. The estimates of total GDP P$ and population in 1960 are 
derived from these growth rates and the absolute numbers for 1999.  
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TABLE 3 
SIMULATED ABSOLUTE INCOME GAP BETWEEN PER CAPITA INCOME   
IN INDIA AND THE US, TWO SCENARIOS 
 
















India     2,240  6%     7,180   41,260  3%     4,050     9,820 
US   31,200  2%   46,360   84,000  2%   46,360   84,000 
   Absolute gap (India-US)  -13,185  ..  -39,180  -42,740  ..  -42,310  -74,180 
   Income ratio (India/US)         7.2  ..       15.5       49.1  ..          8.7         11.7 
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 FIGURE 3 
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE INCOME DISTRIBUTION ACROSS  






























Numbers in italics at top of bars give the accu-
mulated percentage growth of income 1970-99
Relative income distribution: Comprehensive indicators
          Gini 1970: 0.668          Theil 1970: 0.996
          Gini 1999: 0.682          Theil 1999: 0.971
37
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Absolute per capita income in 1999 (P$ 1999)
Absolute per capita income in 1970 (P$ 1999)
Relative income distribution: Income ratio 10 decile to rest
             10/1 10/2 10/3 10/4 10/5 10/6 10/7 10/8 10/9 10/10
1970      92    55    40     30    22    13      7     4       2       1
1999    104    52    36     26    20    15    10     6       3       1
 
Source: basic data from Dikhanov and Ward [2002] FIGURE 4 
SIMULATION OF FUTURE GAP IN GDP PER CAPITA BETWEEN 
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